Professor Hieronymi (UCLA) will be delivering a colloquium entitled The Embodiment of Agency on January 30th at 2:30pm in Dale Hall Tower Rm. 607. If you are interested in the topic, please join us for the presentation and Q&A.
You can visit our guest's site here, and glance over the abstract below:
"In this paper I defend the claim that certain states of mind, such as belief and intention, states which are often thought of as dispositions, are themselves activities—in particular, that they are, or embody, the activity of settling a question (or set of questions). This strange-sounding claim underwrites the strategy I have been advancing for avoiding the problem of free will and moral responsibility. In this paper I will briefly sketch that strategy before turning to the central task of providing additional clarification of and support for this underlying claim. I support it with two moves: First, I hope to show it far less costly than it might appear. We can help ourselves to it by freeing ourselves from the assumption that all activities must involve unfolding processes of change—that activities must be dynamic. Second, I hope to show that denying it is costly. Not only does its denial ensnare us in the free will problem (a point I detail elsewhere), but it also leaves us with an alienated picture of our relation to those states of mind for which we are answerable."
Posted on Fri, January 30, 2015
by Joseph McKinney