Dr. Richard M. Sainsbury Visits Sept. 22nd

"Perception and singularity"
Dr. Richard M. Sainsbury
University of Texas

Although perception is representational, it involves no singular representation. Rather, its representational format is “feature-expressing”, and can be modeled on open sentences, like “x is an apple and x is green”. The content of an experience is correct iff there are perceived objects of which the content is true. This satisfaction condition does all that’s needed to meet demands for perceptual singularity, without attributing singular content to perceptual experience. This makes perception like measuring instruments, for example thermometers, whose content is similarly correct just if true of the objects they measure. I describe some differences between perceptual and conceptual systems of representation, and show how we can distinguish qualitative from numerical identity in thought, but not in perception.

See flyer for more info: Lecture Flier